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I. INTRODUCTION
When Howard Stern made his highly anticipated move from
terrestrial broadcast radio to Sirius Satellite Radio, he emphasized the
differences between the two mediums, particularly as they related to the
regulation of indecent content.' Historically, terrestrial radio has enjoyed
limited First Amendment protection and has been held to specific rules
regarding what can be heard on the public airwaves and also when it can
be heard.2 In the Supreme Court's landmark decision in FCC v. Pacifica,
the Court relied on specific justifications based on the broadcast medium
to uphold the validity of its public airwaves regulations.' In contrast, the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") has
explicitly stated that it does not have the authority to regulate indecent
content on satellite radio in the same way it can justify regulation of the
same content on terrestrial radio,s despite some obvious similarities
between terrestrial and satellite radio.'
Given the recent crackdown on indecent content on terrestrial radio,
the nation's only two satellite radio companies had become a safe haven of
sorts for content that would face heightened scrutiny if it were broadcast
on terrestrial radio. However, the future of this safe haven was placed in
jeopardy when, bridled with extensive debt and the failure to ever turn a
profit,' Sirius and XM came to the FCC in 2007, hat in hand, to obtain
I See Aurele Danoff, "Raised Eybrows" Over Satellite Radio: Has Pacifica Met Its Match?, 34 PEPP. L
REV. 743,773-79 (2007).
2 See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (noting that of all forms of
communication, broadcasting receives the most limited First Amendment protection because of both its
pervasiveness and accessibility to children).
3 Id.
In Pacica, the Court's four main concerns that supported having different regulations for
broadcast media were scarcity of the spectrum, pervasiveness, children, and free access as opposed to
subscription-based services. See id. at 731 n2.
s See, e.g., In re Litigation Recovery Trust, 17 F.C.C.R 21852, 21856 (2002); In re Applications of
Harriscope of Chicago, Inc., 3 F.C.C.R 757, 760 n.2 (1988) (citing Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420 (11th
Cir. 1985)). See also in4a Part IILB and accompanying footnotes.
6 For example, satellite radio, like terrestrial radio, utilizes the electromagnetic spectrum. See
Danoff, supra note 1, at 774. The FCC is charged with allocating spectrum use for the "public interest,
convenience, and necessity." 47 U.S.C. S 307 (2004). Thus, scarcity considerations play an important role in
the FCC's public interest evaluation, and because of this, the FCC may have a valid argument for regulating
satellite digital audio radio services ("SDARS") more heavily. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
391 (1%9) (noting that "the First Amendment confers no right on licensees to prevent others from
broadcasting on 'their' frequencies and no right to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the
Government has denied others the right to use"); sae also Danoff supra note 1, at 774.
7 See In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses XM Satellite Radio
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license-transfer approval for their proposed merger.' The Commission,
engaged in its own crusade against indecent content on both radio and
television,' once again found itself in the extremely powerful position of
deciding the fate of satellite radio"o and, likewise, the fate of unregulated
indecent content on radio.
When Sirius and XM came before the Commission seeking approval
of their merger, the FCC knew that the companies would agree to almost
anything to facilitate the license-transfer approval." After a long and
arduous back-and-forth merger review process, the FCC finally
determined that the merger of the two satellite radio stations was in the
"public interest, convenience, and necessity," but only contingent upon
specific "voluntary" conditions.12 One of these "voluntary" conditions
Holdings, Inc., Transferor To Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., Transferee, 23 F.C.C.R 12348, 12389 (Aug. 5,2008)
(mem. op. & order & report & order) [hereinafter Order].
8 Seegenerally id.
9 See generally In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensee Concerning Their December
31, 2004 Broadcast of the Program "Without a Trace," 21 F.C.C.R 2732 (2006) (fining CBS for an episode
involving a depiction of a teenage orgy); In re Clear Channel Broad. Licenses, Inc., 19 F.C.C.R 6773 (2004)
(noting that Clear Channel Radio was fined for airing segments of Howard Stem's radio program which
referenced anal sex); In re Clear Channel Broad. Licenses, Inc., 19 F.C.C.R 1768 (2004) (noting that the FCC
proposed a fine of $755,000 against Clear Channel Communications for widespread indecency in the "Bubba
the Love Sponge" program); In re Infinity Broadcasting Operations, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R. 19954 (2003) (fining
Infinity Broadcasting Corp. $357,500 for an Opie & Anthony broadcast).
1o Both Sirius and XM argued that the merger was necessary for satellite radio to survive, as neither
company had managed ever to turn over a profit. See Order, supra note 7, at 12389. Sirius's and XM's
marketplace competition "has exacerbated their difficult financial circumstances, as they have competed for
compelling programming and driven up the costs for each other dramatically." Id. at 12445 (dissenting
statement of Comm'r. Jonathan S. Adelstein).
" See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4,39 (1984) ("Often
an agency with the power to deny an application .. .or to delay the grant of the application will grant approval
only if the regulated firm agrees to conditions. The agency may use this power to obtain adherence to rules
that it could not require by invoking statutory authority.").
12 See Order, supra note 7, at 12349, 12352. The author uses quotation marks around "voluntary"
because of the enormous power that the Commission holds over merger applicants. When applicants come to
the FCC seeking merger approval, the Commission's approval is usually the last step in a long process. See,
e.g., Bryan N. Tramont, Too Much Power, Too Little Restraint. How the FCC Expands Its Reach Through
Uneforceable and Umvwieldy "Voluntary"Agreements, 53 FED. COMM. LJ. 49, 52 (2000). In many merger license
transfers the FCC and applicants usually
engage in a high-stakes regulatory dance in which applicants 'volunteer' to take certain
actions or to refrain from certain actions as the quid pro quo for favorable agency
consideration. The resulting 'voluntary' conditions emerge from an elaborate and often
secret process of demands and 'negotiations.' ... Indeed, there appears to be very little
'voluntariness' about this process.
Id. at 52-53. See infra Part II.B and accompanying text.
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agreed to by Sirius, XM, and the Commission was the obligation to offer a
variety of new, smaller programming packages and a la carte channel
options." It was no coincidence that proponents of a la carte
programming have emphasized not only its supposed economic benefits
to consumers, but also, and more importantly, its asserted benefits related
to regulating program content." Taking advantage of the "embattled"
companies' "beleaguered" state,"s the FCC was able to circumvent what it
perceives to be limitations on its authority to regulate indecent content on
satellite radio by indirectly achieving such regulation through voluntary
conditions attached to its structural merger review authority.
This article examines the FCC's authority to regulate indecent
content on satellite radio; the propriety of its decision to utilize merger
conditions, specifically the theme-tiered programming and a la carte
pricing condition, to accomplish a policy goal indirectly that the
Commission has explicitly stated it does not have the authority to achieve
directly; and the effects on the public interest of circumventing what the
FCC perceives as limitations on its authority to regulate indecent content.
Part II provides a brief history of the development of satellite radio and its
relation to terrestrial radio, along with the process that ended in the
FCC's approval of the merger between Sirius and XM, contingent on
specific conditions. Part III examines the FCC's regulation of indecent
content on both terrestrial radio and satellite radio, and the regulatory
differences between the two mediums. Part IV discusses the a la carte
debate, including how the scheme would operate and the proposed
advantages and disadvantages of an a la carte programming option. Part V
describes how a la carte and family-friendly programming requirements
can be used to achieve the policy goal of regulating indecent content, and
how this indirect regulatory route was used by the Commission to
regulate content on satellite radio through the back door. The article
13 See Order, supra note 7, at 12384-89, 12396-97; see also News Release, Sirius XM Satellite Radio,
Sirius XM Gives Listeners the Choice to Customize Programming (Oct. 2, 2008),
httpV/investor.sirius.conVreleasedetail.cfin?releaseid=338100 [hereinafter News Release, Sirius XM Satellite
Radio].
" See, e.g., Lili Levi, FirstReport: The FCC's Regulation ofIndecency, FIRSTAMENDMENT CENTER, Aug.
6, 2007, at 49, httpV/www.firstamendmentcenter.orgfaboutaspx?id=19102 [hereinafter Levi, The FCC's
Regulation] (noting that "[t]here has been a grass-roots movement . . . to push cable to an 'a la carte'
subscription system for those people who do not want access to indecency on cable.").
15 See Michael J. de la Merced, SiriusM Wins a Critical Loan From LAerty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at
B5; SiriusXM Reaches Investment Deal With Liberty, http/dealbookblogs.nytimes.conrr2009/02/17/ sirius-xm-
reaches-loan-deal-withberty/scp=1&sq=%22Sirius%20XM%22%2F/o22embatded%228st=ase (Feb. 17,
2009, 830 EST).
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concludes by arguing that the theme-tiered programming and a la carte
pricing merger condition, as well as the FCC's indirect regulation through
a "voluntary" merger condition, was not in the public interest because of
the highly uncertain potential benefits from a la carte, the FCC's lack of
transparency during the merger review process, and the First Amendment
implications of utilizing a merger condition to regulate speech.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF SATELLITE RADIO AND THE FCC MERGER
APPROVAL CONTINGENT ON SPECIFIC CONDITIONS
A. The Birth of Satellite Radio
The turbulent lives of the country's first commercial satellite radio
companies began in 1990 when Satellite CD Radio, Inc. filed both a
petition with the FCC to allocate spectrum for satellite digital audio radio
services ("SDARS" or "DARS")16  and an application to provide the
service." Acting under its power to allocate the electromagnetic
spectrum," the FCC allocated the 2310-2360 MHz band" (the "S" band)
for SDARS in January 1995.20 The FCC found that allocating the
spectrum for satellite radio offered a number of prospective benefits to the
16 Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, or SDARS, and Digital Audio Radio Service by satellite, or
DARS, both refer to satellite radio. This article will use the term SDARS or satellite radio, but other sources
reference them interchangeably.
17 See In re Establishment of Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Serv. in the
2310-2360 Band, 5 (FCC) (No. 90-357) (Mar. 3, 1997), available at httpV/www.fcc.gov/Bureau
Intemational/Orders/1997/fec97070.txt [hereinafter Establishment of Rules and Policies] (noting that
"Satellite CD Radio, Inc. (CD Radio) initiated this proceeding in 1990 by filing a petition to allocate spectrum
for satellite DARS and an application to provide the service.").
18 The Communications Act of 1934 established the Federal Communications Commission, which
replaced the earlier Federal Radio Commission that was established under the Radio Act of 1927, in order to
regulate "interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio." 47 U.S.C. 5 151 (1996).
Additionally, Congress gave the FCC the power to establish general guidelines of operations and to grant
licenses for use of the spectrum. See id. S 154(i). As stated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the FCC's
power is to be exercised in the "public convenience, interest, or necessity." 395 U.S. 367,379 (1969); see also 47
U.S.CA S 303 (LexisNexis 2010).
19 In November 1992, the FCC established a proceeding to allocate SDARS license applications to
be considered alongside CD Radio's application. See Establishment of Rules and Policies, supra note 17, 5.
Six license applicants filed before the cut-off, but only four remained at the time ofallocation. Id
2 Id. The Commission's rules define SDARS as "[a] radiocommunication service in which audio
programming is digitally transmitted by one or more space stations directly to fixed, mobile, and/or portable
stations, and which may involve complementary repeating terrestrial transmitters, telemetry, tracking and
control facilities." 47 C.F.R 5 25201 (2010).
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public.21 Some of the future benefits included: providing a continuous
high-quality radio service without interruption and fading when traveling
across the continental United States; serving portions of the country that
were underserved or not served at all by terrestrial radio; and increasing
the variety and diversity of programming. 22
Two years later, using a competitive bidding process, four
companies' competed for SDARS licenses.24 In the end, the FCC
granted only two licenses: 2 5 one to Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc. and one to
XM Radio, Inc.26 Significantly, when the FCC granted the two licenses, it
expressly directed that the two satellite radio stations never merge because
the public interest would be served best by two competitive nationwide
27
systems. XM began its service in September 2001 and Sirius initiated its
service in February 2002.28
21 See Establishment of Rules and Policies, supra note 17, 1 2. Not everyone felt the same way,
however. Terrestrial broadcasters expressed a "high level of concern" about SDARS. Id. 1 8. Moreover, the
FCC received letters opposing SDARS from "more than one hundred terrestrial radio station[ ] owners or
operators." Id.
22 Id. 1, 10-17 ("Motorists on the highways of America may soon be able to tune in to one of
many satellite DARS channels offering a particular format without interruption or fading as they travel across
the United States. This new service also has the potential to increase the variety of programming available to
the listening public. Providers may, for example, offer niche channels that would serve listeners with special
interests. Satellite DARS has the technological potential to serve listeners in areas of the country that have
been underserved. While, to some extent, DARS will compete with local radio, we anticipate that it will also
complement terrestrial radio.").
2 Of the six license applicants that filed before the December 15, 1992 cut-off date for SDARS
applications to be considered, four remained at the time of bidding Satellite CD Radio, Inc., Primosphere
Limited Partnership, Digital Satellite Broadcasting Corporation, and American Mobile Radio Corporation. Id
5.
24 See id. 1 6, 73, 143-76 (noting that "[the FCC] will award the two licenses for satellite DARS by
using competitive bidding"); see also 47 U.S.C. S 309() (2009) (authorizing the FCC to auction offspectrum
licenses used to review direct payments from subscribers for receiving or transmitting information).
2 Establishment of Rules and Policies, supra note 17, 1 73 ("There is sufficient spectrum in the S-
band to license only two satellite DARS systems. Dividing the available 25 MHz of spectrum into four equal
segments among the four applicants would result in exclusive frequency assignments of only 6.25 MHz for
each satellite DARS applicant. Because we have found that a viable and competitive satellite DARS service will
require 125 MHz, we can license only two systems.").
26 See id. 173, 78; J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand
and Preemnptive Ofts to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High-Technology Industriesvfrom the Antitrut Diision's
Approval oftheXM-Sirius Satelite Radio Mesger, 4J. COMPETmON L & ECON. 697,721 (2008). Sirius Satellite
Radio, Inc. was formerly known as CD Radio and XM Radio, Inc. was formerly known as American Mobile
Radio. &e Danoff, supra note 1, at 750-51.
27 See Order, supra note 7, at 12420; Establishment of Rules and Policies, supra note 17, 1 78 ("We
agree with commenters, that there should be more than one satellite DARS license awarded. Licensing at least
two service providers will help ensure that subscription rates are competitive as well as provide for a diversity
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To encourage consumer interest and make the new service more
widely available, both companies allied with electronics manufacturers to
build satellite radio receivers for a multitude of locations including cars,
homes, trucks, and boats.29 Moreover, certain unique attributes initially
helped to generate excitement about satellite radio's benefits. For
example, in contrast to terrestrial radio, which only offered a limited
number of channels and weaker signal quality, satellite radio offered a
unique service with "up to 160 digitally transmitted channels with clear
signal quality."3 0 The satellite radio stations also initially offered
commercial-free programming on all of their music channels and listeners
heard fewer commercials on the talk, sports, news, and entertainment
channels than were heard on the average terrestrial radio station.
Another important advantage of satellite radio, as seen both by the FCC
and consumers, was the availability of niche music and entertainment
stations.32  Given this distinctive and dynamic service, "the number of
ofprogramming voices.").
2 See Order, supra note 7, at 12350.
29 Id. at 12350-51; see also Danoff supra note 1, at 751-52; Jessica E. Elliott, Handcuffing the Morality
Police: Can the FCC Constitutionally Regulate Indecency on Satellite Radio?, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. LJ. 263, 276-77
(2006).
0 See Danoff, supra note 1, at 752 (noting that, in contrast to satellite radio, "traditional radio ...
offer[s] a limited number of channels and weak signal quality"); see also Gregory B. Phillips, Indecent Content on
Satellite Radio: Should the FCC Step In?, 26 LOY. LA ENT. L. REv. 237,254 (2006) ("Because the repeaters are
located throughout the United States, a satellite subscriber can listen to the same channel no matter where the
subscriber travels within the United States.").
31 See Order, supra note 7, at 12350-51, 12385; Danoff, supra note 1, at 752; Sidak & Singer, supra note
26, at 722.
32 47 U.S.CA SS 521(4), 532(a) (West 2010) (citing diversity of information sources and services to
the public as a goal ofFCC regulation). See also Danoff, supra note 1, at 752; Phillips, supra note 30, at 254-55
("Satellite radio providers 'may ... offer niche channels that would serve listeners with special interests' that
normally would not generate enough advertisement revenue to warrant broadcasting on terrestrial radio.
These niche programs could 'fulfill a need for more educational programming, rural programming, ethnic
programming, religous programming, and specialized musical programming.'"). The CEO of Sirius, Mel
Karmazin, emphasized the importance ofthe niche programming-
It is all about content and we have the best content on radio. If you take all the Clear
Channel [terrestrial radio] stations and all the Infinity [terrestrial radio] stations, you
cannot have the same diversity as we offer. We have 120 channels in all markets. And we
can offer all kinds of programs.
Danoff supra note 1, at 752 n.46. Highlightingjust how important these niche channels were to consumers,
since the merger, "[m]essage boards, blogs, even the FCC's electronic comment filing system are heating up
with angry subscribers who have seen the ... subtraction of their favorite channels." Leigh M. Murray,
Comment, Sirius Mistake: The FCC's Failure To Stop a Merger to Monopoly in Satellite Radio, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 83,
124(2009).
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subscribers . . . continued to grow" since satellite radio's introduction,
albeit not as quickly as some had hoped.33
B. The FCCs Approval of the Merger Subject to Specific "Voluntary"
Conditions
In February 2007, faced with lagging profits and increased
competition from other audio technologies, Sirius and XM proposed a
multi-million dollar merger between the two companies.3 4  Two
authorities have statutory obligations to review telecommunications
mergers: the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ")3 5 and the
FCC. After more than a year of intense consideration, the DOJ
announced on March 24, 2008, "that it had 'close[d] its investigation of
the transaction' without taking any enforcement action against the
proposed merger."37 With the DOJ's blessing, only the FCC's approval of
the transaction stood in the way of the proposed satellite radio merger.38
Pursuant to its power under 47 U.S.C. S 310(d) of the Communications
Act, the Commission is not obligated to strike down a proposed merger in
its entirety simply because the merger potentially would cause specific
3 See Danoff, supa note 1, at 752-53.
34 See Order, supra note 7, at 12389 (noting that "both Sirius and XM have experienced billions of
dollars in losses and that neither company has ever turned a profit"); Danoff, supra note 1, at 751 n.41;
Consolidated Application for Authority to Transfer Control of XM Radio Inc. and Sirius Satellite Radio Inc.,
XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, and Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee (Mar. 20, 2007)
[hereinafter Application].
3 See 15 U.S.C. 5 18 (1996) (describing the DOJ's authority to regulate monopolies and
combinations in restraint of trade).
36 Cf 15 U.S.C. S 21(a) (1995); 47 U.S.C. SS 214(a), 310(d) (1997). Additionally, of particular
relevance, the FCC has the authority to condition mergers by way of consent decrees under the Clayton Act
or under sections 214(c) and 303(r) of the Communications Act Cf 47 U.S.C. 5 214(c), 303(r) (1997). See
also Sarah Elizabeth Leeper, The Game ofRadopoly:AnAntitrust Perspectiv ofConsolidation in the Radio Industry, 52
FED. COmm. LJ. 473, 478 (2000) ("The FCC and federal antitrust enforcement agencies wear
complementary hats. The DOJ and the FTC analyze media transactions under section 7 of the Clayton Act to
ensure that a merger is procompetitive and challenges those which 'may substantially lessen competition.'
The FCC ensures that a transaction meets the public interest standard by promoting competition and
diversity.") (footnotes omitted).
37 See Order, supra note 7, at 12363. The DOJ reviews communications mergers and transactions
pursuant to its authority under section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers that may substantially
lessen competition in any line ofcommerce. See 15 U.S.C. 5 18 (1996).
3 See Order, supra note 7, at 12363. Because receiving FCC approval was the last hurdle that Sirius
and XM had to clear, the FCC was in a very powerful position. See Tramont, supra note 12, at 52-53, 55-58
(noting that the FCC uses licensees' "vulnerability" to pursue goals outside the traditional policy-making
process).
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public interest harms.39 Instead, the FCC employs a balancing test under
which the benefits of the proposed merger are weighed against any
potential harms.40 Accordingly, when appropriate, the FCC may impose
and enforce certain merger-specific conditions on the proposed entity to
ensure that the merger serves the public interest.4' If the benefits, which
include the merger-specific conditions, outweigh the harms of the
proposed transaction, the merger likely will be found to serve the public
interest. 42 As a consequence, in order to encourage FCC approval more
quickly, as well as to garner the support of interest groups and lobbyists, 43
on June 13, 2008, XM and Sirius provided letters to the Commission
preemptively agreeing to certain "voluntary"" conditions that the
3 See News Corp. and DirecTV Group, Inc., Transferors, and Liberty Media Corp., Transferee, 23
F.C.C.R 3265, 3277-79 (2008) [hereinafter News Corp.] (noting that "the Commission's public interest
authority enables [it], where appropriate, to impose and enforce narrowly tailored, transaction-specific
conditions that ensure that the public interest is served by the transaction" and that "[the FCC's] public
interest authority enables [it] to rely upon [its] extensive regulatory and enforcement experience to impose
and enforce conditions to ensure that a transaction will yield overall public interest benefits"); 47 U.S.C. S
310(d) (1996) ("No construction pennit or station license, or any rights thereunder, shall be transferred,
assigned, or disposed of in any manner, voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or indirectly, or by transfer of
control of any corporation holding such permit or license, to any person except upon application to the
Commission and upon finding by the Commission that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be
served thereby.").
4 Id. at 3277 (noting that "[the FCC] then employ[s] a balancing process, weighing any potential
public interest harms of the proposed transactions against any potential public interest benefits.").
4 Pursuant to section 303(r) of the Communications Act, the FCC has the authority to impose these
merger-specific conditions which may be necessary to ensure that the merger is in the public interest See 47
U.S.C. S 303(r) (1997); Joel D. Corriero, Satellite Radio Monopoly, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 423, 428 (2008);
Tramont, supra note 12, at 57 n.24 (noting that conditioning license grants is a "time-honored ... practice" at
the FCC).
42 See News Corp., supra note 39, at 3277.
4 See Sidak & Singer, supra note 26, at 749-50 (noting that "these goodwill gestures[, including a la
carte pricing] were merely preemptive concessions designed to please key political constituents.").
4 The author includes quotation marks around "voluntary" because ofthe enormous power that the
Commission holds over merger applicants. When applicants come to the FCC seeking merger approval, the
Commission's approval is usually the last step in the long process. See, e.g., Tramont, supra note 12, at 52. In
many merger license transfers the FCC and applicants often
engage in a high-stakes regulatory dance in which applicants 'volunteer' to take certain
actions or to refrain from certain actions as the quid pro quo for favorable agency
consideration. The resulting 'voluntary' conditions emerge from an elaborate and often
secret process of demands and 'negotiations.' . .. Indeed, there appears to be very little
'voluntariness' about this process.
Id. at 52-53.
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companies were willing to implement to demonstrate that the approval of
their transaction would be in the public interest.45
Undoubtedly, one of the most significant preemptive conditions
which Sirius and XM agreed to in order to secure the merger approval4 6
was their offer to freeze the monthly subscription price at the pre-merger
monthly rate and to offer a variety of new tiered programming packages
that the companies described as "a la carte."47 The satellite radio providers
avowed that they would offer two a la carte options and develop a la carte
capable radios, a "Best of Both" programming package, a "mostly music"
package, a "mostly news, sports and talk" package, and a discounted
"family-friendly" package.48 The FCC found that this condition, as well
as the other "voluntary" commitments,4 were in the public interest
45 See Order, supra note 7, at 12359; see also Dan G. Barry, The Effect of Video Frandising Reforn on Net
Neutrality: Does the Beginning oflP Convergence Mean that it is Time for Net Neutrality Regulation, 24 SANTA CARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TEcH. LJ. 421, 444 (2008) (noting that a regulation "[t]ool used by the FCC has been
the creation of conditions in reviewing the mergers of telecommunication companies"); Lisa Blumensaadt,
Comment, Horizontal and Conglomerate Merger Conditions: An Interim Regulatory Approach for a Converged
Environment, 8 COMMIAW CONSPECTUS 291, 307 (2000) (stating that "merger conditions are essentially a
contract between the merging parties and the FCC.").
46 In order to encourage approval of the license transfer, Sirius and XM agreed to a number of
voluntary commitments and other conditions including a price cap, new programming packages and a la carte
options, interoperable radio receivers, open access, third-party access to SDARS capacity, reservation of
channels for noncommercial educational use, and service to Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. See Order, supra
note 7, at 12394-415 app. B. Additionally, the commitments and conditions are to be fulfilled according to the
specified timeline included in the FCC's license transfer approval order. Id. at 12340-41 app. C.
4 See Sidak & Singer, supra note 26, at 703. A la carte pricing "involves purchases of very small
increments," i.e., selling channels individually on cable television or satellite radio. See Thomas W. Hazlett,
Shedding Tiers ForA La Corte?An Economic Analsis ofCable TVPricing, 5J. TELEcOMM. & HIGH TECH. L 253,
267 (2006); see also infra Part IV and accompanying footnotes.
48 See Order, supra note 7, at 12358-59; see also News Release, Sirius XM Satellite Radio, supra note
13; Press Release, Sirius Satellite Radio, XM and SIRIUS to Offer A La Carte Programming (July 23, 2007),
available at httpVfmvestor.sirius.con/ReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaselD=255847 ("One option will allow
subscribers to choose 50 channels for just $6.99 - a 46 percent decrease from the current standard
subscription rate of $12.95. Under this option, customers will also be able to include additional channels for as
litdle as 25 cents each. The second a la carte option will allow subscribers to choose 100 channels and will
allow SIRIUS customers to select from some of the best of XM's programming (and XM subscribers to
choose from some of the best of SIRIUS' programming). The combined SIRIUS-XM will also offer several
other new programming packages, including two 'faiily-friendly' options, as well. Those choosing one of the
'family-friendly' options will be able to block adult-themed programming and, for the first time, receive a
price credit. These packages will set a new standard in audio entertainment and subscription media, offering
lower prices, package options, and 'best of both' offerings.").
4 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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because the benefits of the union outweighed the anticompetitive effects,
and thus approved the proposed merger."o
IHl. INDECENT CONTENT ON SATELLITE RADIO
A. Indecency Regulation by the FCC on Terrestrial Radio
Under 18 U.S.C. S 1464 of the U.S. criminal code, the FCC has the
statutory authority to regulate "obscene, indecent, or profane language"
transmitted "by means of radio communication."5 ' The FCC has defined
indecent material as anything which, in context, "depicts or describes
sexual or excretory organs or activities in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium."52 Current regulations ban indecent content between 6 a.m. and
10 p.m. on terrestrial broadcasts." In order to enforce the ban, the FCC
has the authority to assess forfeiture penalties and initiate license
revocation proceedings or deny license renewal for violations.54
Thus, in indecency cases, the FCC must determine whether the
material describes or depicts sexual or excretory organs or activities and, if
so, whether the material is "patently offensive" when heard in context. 5
There are three primary factors that the Commission examines when
analyzing broadcast material: "(1) whether the description or depiction is
5 See Order, supra note 7, at 12349-50.
51 18 U.S.C. S 1464 (1994) (providing that "[wihoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both."). See also Sidak & Singer, supra note 26, at 714.
52 FCC, Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity - Frequently Asked Questions,
httpVww.fcc.gov/eb/oip/FAQ.html#TheLaw (last visited Nov. 8, 2008); see also In re Indus. Guidance on the
Comm'n's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. S 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency,
Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R 7999,8000 4 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Policy Statement].
5 See 47 C.F.R. S 733999 (2010); see also Sidak & Singer, supra note 26, at 714; FCC, Obscenity,
Indecency & Profanity - Frequently Asked Questions, http/www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/FAQ.html#TheLaw (last
visited Nov. 8,2008).
5 See 47 U.S.C. S 503(b)(2)(C) (2008); see also Sidak & Singer, supra note 26, at 714; see also FCC,
Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity, http//www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/Welcome.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2008).
Forfeiture power was greatly increased in 2005 following the passage of the Broadcast Indecency Enforcement
Act of 2005. See The Broadcast Indecency Enforcement Act of 2005, 47 C.F.R. S 1.80(b)(1) (2010); seegenerally
Michael Strockojust a Concern For Good Manners: The Second Cirruit Strikes Down the FCC's Broadcast Indecency
Regime, 17 U. MIAMI Bus. L REv. 155, 202-05 (2008) (discussing the recent significant increase in federal
indecency fines).
5 FCC, Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity - Frequently Asked Questions, http;//www.fcc.gov/eb/
oip/FAQ.html#TheLaw (last visited Nov. 8,2008).
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explicit or graphic; (2) whether the material dwells on or repeats at length
descriptions or depictions of sexual or excretory organs; and (3) whether
the material appears to pander or is used to titillate or shock."" No single
factor is dispositive of an indecency case."
The foundation of modem indecency regulation was laid in 1978 in
FCC v. Pacifica." Pacifica involved a radio broadcast of comedian George
Carlin's monologue entitled "Filthy Words," which aired in the middle of
the day." A member of the group Morality in Media complained that his
"young son" had heard the "indecent" monologue."o Facing a First
Amendment challenge, the Supreme Court in Pacifica "narrowly upheld"
the FCC's authority to regulate indecency." The Court held that due to
the "uniquely pervasive" nature of broadcast media in the home, as well as
its unique accessibility to children, the Commission had sufficient
justification to regulate broadcast content and impose sanctions.62
Following the Court's decision in Pacifica, the Commission exercised
extreme restraint in utilizing its newly approved power to regulate
indecent content broadcasted on the public airwaves. Over the next
decade, the FCC restricted its indecency enforcement to occasions in
which broadcasters used the "seven dirty words" referenced in Carlin's
monologue before 10 p.m.63 However, in 1987, the FCC moved away
from its reserved approach regarding indecency regulation to a new
approach, under which the agency would begin enforcing a general
definition of indecency against language or material that depicts or
describes in patently offensive terms measured by existing standards for
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); see also Ron Whitworth, Comment, IP Video: Putting
Control in the Hands of the Consumers, 14 COMMlAW CONSPECTUS 207, 235 (2005). "[T]he FCC did not
develop a significant jurisprudence of Section 1464 until 1970, when it explicitly adopted a broad definition of
indecency." Levi, The FCCs Regulation, supra note 14, at 11.
5 Pacfica, 438 U.S. at 729-30. Carlin began his monologue by describing his thoughts about "the
words you couldn't say on the public, ah, airwaves, urn, the ones you definitely wouldn't say, ever." Id. at 729.
6 See Levi, The FCC's Regulation, supra note 14, at 11 (noting that the "young son" was, in fact, 15
years old); see also LUCAS A. PowEJR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 162-210
(1987) (suggesting that the complaint was part of a political strategy by Morality in Media and that the
complainant might not have heard the actual broadcast).
61 See Levi, The FCC's Regulation, supra note 14, at 1.
62 Pacica, 438 U.S. at 748-50; see also Witworth, supra note 58, at 235. Notably, the Court in Pacfca
explicitly stated that it was not ruling on the FCC's general authority to regulate indecency. Instead, the Court
was affirming the Commission's regulation against a program as broadcast. Pacpica, 438 U.S. at 750-51.
6 Lili Levi, The Hard Case ofBradcast Indeceney, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L & Soc. CHANGE 49,90-91 (1992)
[hereinafter Levi, The Hard Case]; Levi, The FCC's Regulation, supra note 14, at 11.
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the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs.' The
Commission consequently issued three decisions that set forth this new
approach to indecency regulation.65
During the 1990s, the FCC engaged in more limited indecency
enforcement, contrary to what its 1987 decisions might have suggested.'
The typical amount for indecency fines imposed by the Commission
during the second term of the Clinton Administration ranged from
$25,000 to $49,000.67 However, in 2003, the Commission's approach to
indecency regulation changed significantly.' During the tenure of then-
Chairman Michael Powell, the FCC imposed indecency fines totaling
$7,928,080 in 2004 alone.
Most recently, under the leadership of former Chairman Kevin
Martin, the FCC responded more harshly to indecent audio content on
national television broadcasts and terrestrial radio programs.70  For
example, in In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding
Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program,71 the Commission held
that the " 'F-word,' even when used as an intensifying adjective or insult,
carries inherently sexual connotations and thus will always satisfy the first
prong of the indecency analysis." 72  The Commission also expressly
overturned its own prior decisions, finding that "even isolated uses of the 'F-
word' may violate the second 'patently offensive' prong of indecency
analysis." Additionally, the Commission in Golden Globes acknowledged
a new, independent ground for liability: the use of expletives, regardless of
64 In re Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R 2698,2699 (1987); FCC v. Pacica, 438 U.S. 726,732 (1978)
(citing In re Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94,98 (1975)).
65 See In re Pacifica Found. Inc., 2 F.C.C.R 2698, 2698 (1987); In re Regents of Univ. of Cal., 2
F.C.C.R 2703,2703 (1987); In re Infinity Broad. Corp. ofPa., 2 F.C.C.R 2705,2705 (1987).
6 See, e.g., Keith Brown & Adam Candeub, The Law and Economis of Wardrobe Mafunion, 2005
B.Y.U. L REV. 1463,1492-93, 1493 n.180 (2005) (noting that between 1987 and 2001, the FCC issued only 52
fines for indecency).
67 Id. at 1493; Levi, The FCC's Regulation, supra note 14, at 13. The total amount of fines for
indecency during the second Clinton Administration seems especially low when compared to the total
amount of fines for indecency in 2004 during the Bush Administration and under then-Chairman Michael
Powell. See id.
68 See Levi, The FCCs Regulaion, supra note 14, at 2.
69 Id. at 13.
70 See, e.g., Sidak & Singer, supra note 26, at 714; In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licenses
Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, Mem. Op. and Order, 19 F.C.C.R 4975
(2004) [hereinafter Golden Globes Order].
71 Se enerally Golden Globes Order, supra note 70.
72 Sidak & Singer, supra note 26, at 714-15; see also Golden Globes Order, supra note 70, at 4979.
73 Golden Globes Order, supra note 70, at 4980; Sidak & Singer, supra note 26, at 715.
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their sexual or excretory connotation, may be "profane"' under section
1464.74 This new statutory interpretation significantly expanded the
"potential liability for terrestrial radio broadcasters, especially for 'shock
jock' talk radio[,]" prompting controversial programs to make the move
from terrestrial radio to satellite radio.
B. Satellite Radio and Indecency Regulation by the FCC
Following the Commission's decision in Golden Globes, the FCC
continued to increase its indecency enforcement against broadcasters,
including terrestrial radio." Additionally, in 2006, Congress passed the
Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act, which raised potential fines to
$325,000 per violation, or per day for continuing violations.7
Despite this increased indecency enforcement, because satellite radio
is a subscription-based service similar to direct broadcast satellite
("DBS"), the FCC has explicitly chosen not to apply its broadcast
indecency rules to SDARS providers. In a letter to the Commission, Mt.
74 See Golden Globes Order, supra note 70, at 4981; 18 U.S.C. S 1464 (1994) (prohibiting the
broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or profane language"); Sidak & Singer, supra note 26, at 715. Subsequently,
the Second Circuit vacated the FCC's order in Golden Globes and remanded the proceeding to the agency.
See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444,446-47 (2d Cir. 2007). On November 1, 2007, the
FCC filed a petition for writ of certiorari, requesting that the Supreme Court review the Second Circuies
decision. See Tony Mauro, Justices To Examine 'Fleeting' Expletives, First Amendment Center (March 18,
2008), http/www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id= 19811. The Supreme Court decided to grant
review in FCC v. Fox Television Stations (07-582) on March 17, 2008. Id. The Court issued its decision in Fox
on April 28, 2009. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). In an
opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court in Fox held that "the Commission's new enforcement policy
[which permitted the FCC to treat even isolated uses of sexual and excretory words as actionably indecent]
and its order finding the [particular offending] broadcasts actionably indecent were neither arbitrary nor
capricious." Id. at 1812-13.
7 See Sidak & Singer, supra note 26, at 715. Terrestrial radio programs decided to move to satellite
radio due to the FCC's decision not to apply its broadcast indecency standards to SDARS providers. See Letter
from W. Kenneth Ferree, FCC Media Bureau Chief to Saul Levine, President of Mt. Wilson FM
Broadcasters, Inc. (Dec. 14, 2004), available at httpV/allfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DA-04-
3907A1.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Letter from W. Kenneth Ferree]; see also infra Part Jll.B.
76 See Sidak & Singer, supra note 26, at 715. For example, Clear Channel Communications received
a $495,000 notice of apparent liability for an episode of The Howard Sem Show, in addition to a $755,000 notice
of apparent liability for a broadcast by radio host "Bubba the Love Sponge." Id.; see also Sarah McBride, Clear
Channd Dumps Stem After Big Fine, WAIL ST.J., Apr. 9, 2004, at Bl.
n See Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, Pub. L No. 109-235, 120 Stat. 491 (2006); Sidak
& Singer, supra note 26, at 715-16.
78 See, e.g., In re Litig. Recovery Trust, 17 F.C.C.R 21852, 21856 (2002); In re Applications of
Harriscope of Chi, Inc., 3 F.C.C.R 757, 760 n.2 (1988). See also Sidak & Singer, supra note 26, at 716. Cable
also receives "a more relaxed standard of scrutiny" because of"fundamental technological differences between
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Wilson FM Broadcasters requested that the FCC subject satellite radio
providers to the same indecency standards established in Pacifica and
promulgated through the years." However, in his reply letter, W.
Kenneth Ferree, Media Bureau Chief, declined to extend traditional
broadcast indecency regulations to satellite radio because XM and Sirius
provide their services on a subscription basis and "[t]he Commission has
previously ruled that 'subscription-based services do not call into play the
issue of indecency."'so
While the issue of whether the FCC could, in fact, impose its
indecency standards on satellite radio is not settled law," the FCC's
current decision not to extend its indecency rules to SDARS providers, in
part, is based upon the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group.Y In Playboy, the Supreme Court held that cable
operators' content is afforded greater First Amendment protection than
broadcast licensees' and thus any regulation of cable content should be
subject to strict scrutiny analysis.' Because subscription services require
consumers to take affirmative steps to bring the video or audio content
into their homes or cars, the Commission has held that the services are
not as "uniquely pervasive" as traditional broadcast media.' Moreover,
due to the fact that less restrictive means exist to restrict content through
technology such as targeted blocking, the Court held that the particular
regulation in Playboy did not meet the "narrowly tailored" prong of strict
broadcast and cable transmission." Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 639 (1994).
7 See Letter from W. Kenneth Ferree, supra note 75.
so Id. (citing In re Applications of Harriscope of Chi., Inc., 3 F.C.C.R. 757, 760 n.2 (1988)).
81 See, e.g., Robert Corn-Revere, Can Broadcast Indecency Regulations be Extended to Cable Television and
Satellite Radio?, 30 S. ILL. U. L.J. 243, 271 (2006) (concluding that "any effort to extend indecency regulation to
cable television or other non-broadcast media would be almost certain to fail a constitutional challenge");
Elliott, supra note 29, at 283-85 (arguing that industry self-regulation is the appropriate response to indecent
content on satellite radio); Phillips, supra note 30, at 277-86 (asserting that regulating satellite radio content via
traditional broadcast indecency regulations would violate the First Amendment). Satellite radio employs
wireless broadcast and might therefore be thought to fall under traditional broadcast law. See Danoff, supra
note 1, at 789 (noting that "[tihe FCC.. has more authority to regulate satellite radio than cable because of
spectrum considerations"); Matthew S. Schwartz, A Decent Proposal: The Constitutionality of Indecency Regulation
on Cable and Direct Broadcast Satellite Sevices, 13 RICH. J.L & TECH. 17, 120 (2007) (noting that "[t]he cable
industry has a stronger defense [against FCC indecency regulation] because cable is by definition non-
broadcast and therefore not subject to S 1464, which only applies to 'radio communications'").
2 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
8 Id. at 804. Strict scrutiny necessitates that regulations must be "narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling Government interest, and if a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose,
the legislature must use that alternative." Id.
84 See id. at 805; q FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 727 (1978) (holding that the government
has sufficientjustification to regulate broadcast media because of its "uniquely pervasive" nature).
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scrutiny analysis.ss In following the Court's holding in Playboy,
"regulation of [indecent] content delivered through subscription-based
multichannel video platforms draws separate treatment by the FCC and
heightened First Amendment scrutiny by reviewing courts.""
The FCC's decision not to apply traditional broadcast indecency
standards to satellite radio providers is most likely also premised upon the
fact that, as a subscription-based service, SDARS does not allow for the
same "indiscriminate access to children that characterizes [traditional]
broadcasting." Additionally, technological advances have permitted
satellite radio providers to block specific channels upon consumer request,
which is similar to the technology used by satellite television and cable
providers." On the other hand, satellite radio operates in the same way as
traditional broadcast stations in that both utilize the limited
electromagnetic spectrum, while cable and other media do not use the
limited spectrum.' Because the FCC is charged with allocating spectrum
use for the "public interest, convenience, and necessity,"90 scarcity
considerations, historically, have played an important role in the FCC's
public interest evaluation." For that reason, the Commission may have a
valid argument for regulating SDARS more heavily than, for example,
cable.'
Notwithstanding the ongoing academic debate, a large quantity of
indecent video and audio content has shifted to cable networks, DBS, and
8 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 804,814.
86 Sidak & Singer, supra note 26, at 716.
8 In re Harriscope of Chi., Inc., 3 F.C.C.R 757,760 n.2 (1988) (citing Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415,
1420 (11th Cir. 1985)). See also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 727-28, 748-50 (1978) (noting the
"uniquely pervasive presence" ofbroadcasting and that broadcasting is "uniquely accessible to children.").
8 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 29, at 278-79 (noting that XM and Sirius allowed for selective blocking
of channels with request by the subscriber).
8 See Levi, The FCC's Regulation, supra note 14, at 49; David L. Hudson, Jr., Indecency Regulation:
Beyond Broadcast?, First Amendment Center (Dec. 5, 2007), httpV/www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
analysis.aspx?id= 19408.
9 47 U.S.C. S 302(a) (2000).
91 Nat'1 Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-18 (1943). Because the radio spectrum
simply is not large enough to accommodate all applicants, the FCC must be empowered to make decisions in
order to allocate the spectrum in furtherance of the public convenience, interest, or necessity. See id. at 213,
216-18 ("There is a fixed natural limitation upon the number of stations that can operate without interfering
with one another. Regulation of radio was therefore as vital to its development as traffic control was to the
development of the automobile.").
9 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,391 (1969) (noting that "the First Amendment
confers no right on licensees to prevent others from broadcasting on 'their' frequencies and no right to an
unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied others the right to use").
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SDARS, where it receives greater First Amendment protection," as a
consequence of the FCC's decision that it lacked the authority to regulate
indecency on subscription-based services.94 As the number of "indecent"
programs moving to satellite radio continued to grow, politicians and the
public" lobbied for the FCC to apply its traditional broadcast indecency
regulations to satellite radio."
C. Self-Regulation on Satellite Radio
Since the FCC explicitly declined to extend traditional broadcast
indecency standards to satellite radio providers, satellite radio programs
were in large part self-regulated. Prior to the merger approval, both Sirius
and XM had been self-regulating their content by taking steps to allow for
parental control over the programming available to each satellite radio
receiver. 97  By self-regulating, the satellite radio companies were
attempting to avoid FCC intervention. The more clearly that Sirius and
XM were able to demonstrate that they were providing consumers with
the appropriate tools to adjust the content they received based on their
own preferences, the less it would appear that the FCC had the authority
to impose its own restrictions. 98 Because of this, XM allowed for selective
9 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 804 (2000).
9 See Sidak & Singer, supra note 26, at 701-02. Notably, in 2004, the chief executive ofTXM said that
the station wanted to become "the HBO of radio," meaning that, in terms of content regulation, satellite radio
would receive the same level of First Amendment protection that other subscription-based services, such as
HBO, receive. See id. at 702. The prominent radio shockjock, Howard Stern, announced on October 6,2004
that he would be leaving his syndicated morning talk show with Infinity Broadcasting to begin broadcasting on
Sirius Satellite Radio. Bill Carter & Jeff Leeds, Howard Stem Signs Rich Deal in jump to Satellite Radio, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 7, 2004, at Al. Stem decided to make the move to avoid the FCC's heightened indecency
enforcement, which included enormous fines for some of the content on his show. Id.
9 See Levi, The FCC's Regulation, supra note 14, at 28 (noting that "[a] complementary explanation for
the commission's [recent increase in anti-indecency] activity focuses on the increasing pressure brought to
bear on the commission both by Congress and by certain private interest groups such as the Parents
Television Council."). Whether or not "the public" has actually become more outraged by indecent content
on television is not necessarily clear because of a variety of reasons, including the development of form letters
generated by the Parents Television Council. Id. at 29.
96 See, e.g., Protecting Children From Vwlent and Indecent Programming: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Commere, Sciene, and Transp., 108th Cong. 5-6 (2004) (statement of Kevin J. Martin, Comm'r, FCC)
[hereinafter Martin Statement] (noting that "programming that broadcast networks reject because of concerns
about content may end up on competing basic cable networks, and radio personalities that we have fined for
indecency violationsjust move to satellite radio" and because of this "basic indecency and profanity restrictions
may be a viable alternative that also should be considered").
9 See Elliott, supra note 29, at 278-79; Phillips, supra note 30, at 281-82.
98 See Levi, The FCC's Regulation, supra note 14, at 34 ("The cable, movie and DBS companies have
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blocking of channels by the request of the subscriber.99 Moreover,
channels which XM deemed as having a "high frequency" of explicit
language were distinguished by including "XL" on both the channel line-
up and receivers." Similarly, Sirius also offered consumers a channel
blocking choice.'o
Although, both Sirius and XM were self-regulating their content by
distinguishing channels with explicit content and offering channel-
blocking options, critics still did not believe this type of regulation was
sufficient. While consumers who did not wish to listen to channels with a
high frequency of explicit language could request that certain channels be
blocked, these consumers still were effectively required to pay for the
blocked channels because they were only offered as part of a large bundled
package. Moreover, neither Sirius nor XM offered any "family friendly"
package options for consumers who solely wished to listen to music and
programs without controversial, indecent content.102 As a consequence,
certain Commissioners, Congressmen, and interest groups believed that
the FCC should become involved and commence regulation of indecency
on satellite radio.'03
IV. A LA CARTE PROPOSAL
A. Former FCC Chairman Kevin Martin's Anti-Indecency and a la Carte
Agendas
Former FCC Chairman Kevin Martin began his crusade against
indecent content even before he was appointed Chairman. In 2004,
before Congress and elsewhere, Martin contended that there should be a
standardized approach in all electronic media regarding indecency and
that such an approach should not be deregulatory.10 Former Chairman
recently advised Congress that they are engaging in an unprecedented joint effort to educate the public and to
create flirnily-friendly tiers of programming to advance consumer choice. This is likely an attempt to deflect 'a
la carte' proposals for cable and other subscription services now sold on a tiered basis.") (footnotes omitted).
9 See Elliott, supra note 29, at 278. Channel blocking is not available for XM's online service. Id
1oo Id.
101 Id. at 279. Unlike XM, Sirius does not distinguish channels with a high frequency of adult
programming Id.
102 See, eg., Martin Statement, supra note 96, at 5-6 (reiterating that "[if cable and satelite operators continue
to rfise to ofer parents more tools sudi as family-friendly programming packagers, basic indecency and profanity
restrictions may be a viable alternative that also should be considered") (emphasis added).
103 See id.
104 See The Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004: Hearings on H.R 3717 Before the Subcomm. on
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Martin lobbied both for heavier fines for broadcast indecency,'05 as well as
for targeting indecent content airing on the cable and satellite media,'o
which as noted above, are not subject to the same indecency regulations as
are broadcasters."0 7 Martin called for cable and satellite providers to
develop family-friendly programming tiers, without which, Martin
advised Congress, the government would intervene and apply traditional
broadcast indecency standards.' "We need to make the decision to air
indecent . . . language a bad business decision," Martin declared when
addressing Congress in 2004.109
In addition to and complementing his anti-indecency views, Martin
expressed his desire that the television industry provide parents with more
navigational tools and offer family-friendly programming packages."o
While observing that "the advances in television and the development of
competing providers of video programming have resulted in
unprecedented choice for consumers," Martin argued that for families,
"the situation can be somewhat of a Catch-22."" He noted that if a
family subscribed to a multi-channel video programming distributor
Telecomm. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 68 (2004) (statement of Kevin
Martin) (endorsing an extension of indecency regulation to cable and satellite providers); Levi, The FCC's
Regulation, supra note 14, at 49.
1os Todd Shields, New FCC Chair Kevin Manin Talks Tough, RADIO MONTOR, Mar. 21, 2005,
available at http//vww.allbusiness.corrservices/motion-pictures/4462469-.htmL
106 Phillips, supra note 30, at 260 ("[P]rior to his appointment as FCC Chairman, Kevin Martin
discussed in February 2004 his belief that Congress should consider whether satellite radio and cable television
should adhere to the same indecency standards as their broadcast equivalents. Martin explained that
broadcasters complain that the 'rules have to be fair to everyone who is in this medium [radio or television],'
and stated his own belief that satellite radio content regulation is a 'legitimate issue."'); The Broadcast Decency
Enforcement Act of 2004: Hearings on H.R 3717 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet ofthe H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 68 (2004) (statement of Kevin Martin) (noting that former Chairman
Martin has endorsed an extension of indecency regulation to both cable and satellite providers).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (cable broadcast);
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 639 (1994) (noting that cable receives a "more relaxed standard of
scrutiny" because of "fundamental technological differences between broadcast and cable transmission"); FCC
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (radio broadcasts); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420 (11th Cir. 1985)
(distinguishing Pacilfca from cases in which cable subscriber affirmatively chooses to have cable service come
into the home).
1os Shields, supra note 105. Whether or not Congress has the authority to regulate indecent content
on cable and satellite providers in the same way that it does so in the broadcast medium is debatable. See supra
Part 1.B and accompanying footnotes.
109 Shields, supra note 105.
110 KevinJ. Martin, Family-Friendly Programming: Providing More Tools for Parents, 55 FED. COMM. LJ.
553,553-54(2003).
III Id. at 556.
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("MVPD"), the family would receive "a significant selection of high-
quality, family-friendly programming, but also [would be] forced to buy some of
the most family-unfriendly programming produced for television."" 2 According to
Martin and other supporters, however, if a la carte programming were
available, families would be able to benefit from "excellent family-
oriented channels" without being required to subscribe to "channels they
believe have less appropriate programming."" 3
B. A la Carte Proposal for Cable and Satellite Television
In the shadow of the ongoing battle over indecent content, certain
members of the Commission and Congress" 4 were pushing for cable
providers to offer a la carte programming options for their consumers."s
Currently, cable companies generally offer their channels in bundled basic
cable tiers."' When cable subscribers wish to receive an "expanded basic
tier,""' they are forced to purchase one large package of basic cable
channels, without the option of customizing their order; this packaging
method used by cable companies is similar to the large bundled packages
of stations sold by both Sirius and XM."' Proponents of a la carte,
however, argue that consumers should be able to customize their orders
and pick their own cable networks based on their specific content
preferences." 9  The proponents consequently assert that consumers
would benefit from a la carte programming because they would not be
obligated to pay for television shows or radio programs that they had no
interest in viewing or found offensive. 20
This is the basic argument proponents set forth for a la carte channel
options for cable and satellite subscribers. Whether or not the FCC
112 Id. (emphasis added).
113 See Shields, supra note 105.
114 Former FCC Chairman Kevin Martin, as well as Sen. John McCain, are proponents of a la carte
programming See, e.g., Hazlett, supra note 47, at 255 (noting that Sen. John McCain "criticize[d] cable
operators for restricting customers' choices").
115 A la carte programming involves consumers selecting specific channels that they would like to
receive and then only subscribing to their specific chosen channels. See Schwartz, supra note 81, at 113.
116 See Hazlett, supra note 47, at 255.
117 The "expanded basic tier" is in contrast to the "basic tier" or "bare bones" offering, which includes
local TV stations. Id. at 255 n.2
118 Id. at 255. Channels usually found in the expanded basic tier include USA, WTBS, ESPN,
Lifetime, CNN, Fox News, and MTV. Id.
119 Id. ("If shoppers can choose between apples and oranges at the grocery store, rather than a big bag
of both, why shouldn't they be allowed to pick their own cable networks?").
120 Id.
SIRIUS XM SATELLITE RADIO MERGER
should compel cable and satellite providers to supply channels on an a la
carte basis was "one of the most hotly contested issues in 2004.",121 Some
proponents argued that "monopoly power has resulted in current cable
industry pricing policies," while other proponents demanded a la carte
directives "to enhance parental control over programming."'2 2
Although a 2004 FCC report suggested that a la carte was not
desirable for economic reasons and was "a particularly blunt instrument"
for regulating indecent content considering other cheaper technical
solutions available to consumers to block unwanted content," pressure
from many consumer groups and well-known politicians remained on the
Commission to enable more control over consumers' cable television
options. 24 Similarly, Congress and specific interest groups continued to
place increasing pressure on the FCC for stricter enforcement of
indecency rules.12 Notably, a la carte programming had been promoted
as a tool that would provide consumers with more control over their
programming options and as part of the effort to combat indecency.'26 As
a result, in February 2006, then-Chairman Martin and the FCC issued a
second report concerning the practicality of a la carte programming, this
time defending the idea as in the public interest.'27 The "recalculation"'28 in
121 Whitworth, supra note 58, at 209.
122 Hazlett, supra note 47, at 255-56.
123 FED. COMM. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE PACKAGING AND SALE OF VIDEO PROGRAMMING
SERVICES TO THE PUBuC, 2004 FCC LEXIs 6518 (2004), at *73 [hereinafter FCC REPORT ON A IA CARTE
1] ("As a tool to allow subscribers to block objectionable content from reaching their homes, an a la carte
requirement seems to be a particularly blunt instrument Technical solutions that block unwanted content
exist today at a lesser cost than a mandated a la carte requirement."). See also Hazlett, supra note 47, at 289-90;
Corn-Revere, supra note 81, at 246-47.
124 Whitworth, suipra note 58, at 209. See also FCC REPORT ON A LA CARTE I, supra note 123, at *2
("Earlier this year, several members of the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Energy and
Commerce wrote to Federal Communications Commission Chairman Michael Powell asking for
Commission insight on the 'efficacy of providing a la carte and themed-tier services to cable and satellite
subscribers.' Separately, Senator John McCain, Chairman of the United States Senate, Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, asked Chairman Powell to 'explore all available options ... to
promote a la carte and satellite offerings as soon as possible where such offerings would benefit consumers.'")
(footnotes omitted).
125 See Ievi, The FCC's Regulation, supra note 14, at 28; Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005,
Pub. L No. 109-235, 5 2, 120 Stat. 491 (indicating congressional concern about indecent broadcast
programming); Brown & Candeub, supra note 66, at 1464-65, 1465 n.8 (noting that "99.9/o of the indecency
complaints in 2003 were filed by the Parents Television Council").
126 See, e.g., Hazlett,supra note 47, at 268; Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. ChiefProds Pay TV To Hdp Combat
Indecency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,2005, at C3.
'2 See generally FED. COMM. COMM'N, FURTHER REPORT ON THE PACKAGING AND SALE OF
VIDEO PROGRAMMING SERVS. TO THE PUBLIC, No. 04-2(Y7, 2006 WL 305873 (2006) [hereinafter FCC
2412010]1
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the second report permitted the FCC to attempt to make the case for a la
carte as "a pro-consumer regulatory policy," 129 despite the apparent about-
face made by the Commission and the lack of objective analysis.
C. How a la Carte Works
A la carte pricing involves purchasing channels in smaller increments
as compared to the traditional larger bundled packages.' The traditional
a la carte unit would consist of a monthly subscription to a single program
network, but as economist and law professor Thomas W. Hazlett suggests,
"unbundling could also be applied to the purchase of program networks
for shorter intervals . .. or to the purchase of individual programs."
Some proponents of a la carte programming have also proposed an "a la
carte light" policy suggestion.132  Under an a la carte light option,
subscription providers offer "a larger number of tiers on which . . .
networks are clustered according to genre-news, family, sports, etc." 33
Before being appointed as Chairman, then-Commissioner Martin
suggested two paradigms for a la carte programming: "(1) parents could
'opt in' [to] particular satellite radio . . . programs; and (2) customers
could choose a specific number of channels from a list of programming
for a fixed price." 34
REPORT ON A LA CARTE I]. See also Hazlett, supra note 47, at 289-90. "In a fascinating game of regulatory
'gotcha' . . . the [FCC] has issued sharply conflicting reports projecting exactly how a la carte rules would
change pricing for cable TV services." Id. at 289. The second FCC report "uncovered numerical errors" in
the first study and concluded that "'[t]he corrected calculations show that a subscriber could receive as many
as 20 channels, including six broadcast signals, without seeing an increase in his or her monthly bill.'" Id. at
290.
128 According to a report issued by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce entitled
"Deception and Distrust: The Federal Communications Commission Under Chairman Kevin J. Martin,"
Martin manipulated information given to his fellow commissioners and Congress, specifically involving the
findings of the initial a la carte study conducted in 2004. See Stephanie Condon, Congreussional Report: FCC
Chair Abued Power, CNET NEWS (Dec. 9, 2008), http/news.cnetconm8301-13578_3-10119069-
38.html?subj=news&tag=2547-1_3-0-20&part=sphere. Martin's reversal of the first report's findings
concerning the viability of a la carte provoked suspicion both inside and outside the FCC that the second
report was not based on objective analysis. Id.
129 See Hazlett, supra note 47, at 290.
130 See supra Part V.B.
131 Hazlett, supra note 47, at 267-68.
132 Id. at 267 n.41.
133 Id.
' Danoff supra note 1, at 785; see Open Fomum on Dceny Before dte S. Corn. on Comnere, Sciewe and
Transp., 109th Cong. 13-16 (2005) (statement ofKevinJ. Martin, Chairman, FCC).
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D. Advantages and Disadvantages
1. Advantages
Generally, supporters of a la carte programming options make two
distinct arguments for directives requiring cable operators to provide
consumers with the option of purchasing channels on an individual basis.
The first argument involves an economic justification, while the second
argument involves a social justification.13 1 Professor Thomas W. Hazlett
points out that these two rationales are "theoretically independent of one
another," however in practice "the arguments tend to converge." 36
In terms of economic justifications, proponents of a la carte pricing
assert that it will reduce consumer bills."' The idea behind this rationale
is that most consumers rarely watch or listen to all of the channels which
they are required to purchase under the current bundled packages.'13  Due
to this fact, many consumers, who may be on a tighter budget, are
currently paying more for these tiered packages in order to receive specific
desired channels, but are, at the same time, paying for additional channels
that they rarely watch.'
In terms of social justifications, proponents argue that a la carte
options "will end the flow of unwanted programming, with offensive content,
into subscribers' homes.""4 The underlying idea behind the social
justification argument is that families should not be compelled to support
programming which they find distasteful and offensive.14' When cable
customers subscribe to their cable company's tiered programming, they
admittedly have some choice, but not nearly as much as the courts seem
to presume.14 2 Even with options such as channel blocking available to
1s See Hazlett, supra note 47, at 268.
136 Id. ("These rationales are theoretically independent of one another. The elimination of unwanted
programming may provide a valuable service, such that cable subscribers would be willing to pay more for
service with fewer (unwanted) channels. Yet, in practice, the arguments tend to converge. Those who
espouse the social justification for a la carte also argue that prices for reduced bundles should be lower.").
137 Id. at 268-69.
138 Id. at 268.
139 Id. at 269 ("Consumers are forced to pay for the added, low value channels because they do not
want to give up the whole bundle. Since there is little competition and the competitors offer bundles too,
there is no real alternative.").
' Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
1' Hazlett, supra note 47, at 269.
142 See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654,660 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (asserting that
"[u]nlike cable subscribers, who are offered such options as 'pay-per-view' channels, broadcast audiences have
no choice but to'subscribe' to the entire output of traditional broadcasters."); Schwartz, supra note 81, at 41.
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customers, consumers are nonetheless forced to purchase, and
consequently support, channels, which they find objectionable, in order to
purchase the channels that they find beneficial.143 Providing consumers
with the option of purchasing channels a la carte would give customers
more choices and significantly more control over the programs that enter
their homes or cars. With a la carte, customers can purchase only those
specific channels that they perceive as beneficial and, thus, obtain
increased control over the programs which they and their children view.
2. Disadvantages
On the other hand, opponents of a la carte programming offer their
own reasons why a la carte pricing is not in consumers' best interest. Two
of the opponents' main arguments involve the negative effects on the
variety of programming offered by companies and the economic harms of
a la carte pricing.
One important reason opponents disfavor unbundling is because of a
la carte programming's potential negative effects on the diversity of
programming available, specifically programming by various minority
groups.'" Because popular channels financially support less popular
channels when they are offered in bundled tiers, consumers are provided
with a greater variety of programming options when channels are offered
under the current tiers than they would be if the channels were offered on
an a la carte basis.'45 If startup and niche programming were not included
in the current broad tiers, those channels might not be able to compete
with other more "mainstream" channels and, thus, would struggle
143 Press Release, Statement of L. Brent Bozell, 11I, Founder and President of the Parents Television
Council on Cable Choice (May 5, 2004), httpV/www.cwfa.orgfmages/contentbozell-cc.pdf ("There is
something terribly and findamentally wrong with requiring consumers to pay for a product they don't want,
and may even find offensive, in order to get something they do want. It's like a grocery store telling you that in
order to buy a gallon of milk- you also have to buy a six-pack of beer and a carton of cigarettes."); Hazlett, supra
note 47, at 269.
144 See Michael Grebb, Cable a la Cate Still Half-Baked, WIRED NEWS, July 14, 2004, available at
httpV/www.wired.corninews/politics/),1283,64203,00.html; Andrew M. Kulpa, Distributing Yesterday's Media,
Tomorow: How Media Companies Mask Antiqued Operating Models wih the Veil of Copyrght, 16 SETON HALLJ.
SPORTS &ENT. L. 225,239 (2006).
145 See Grebb, supra note 144; see also Kulpa, supra note 144, at 239; The Nat'l Cable & Telecomm.
Ass'n, The Pi fals of A La Carte, at 1 (2004), available at http/www.ncta.corn/DocumentBinay.aspx?id=42
[hereinafter NCTA] ("This unprecedented diversity has been made possible by virtue of program packages,
or 'tiers.' Tiers combine new networks with well-established networks, thereby allowing new networks to be
sampled by consumers so they can find and build an audience.").
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financially to survive.146 As a result, these diverse programming options
would disappear from the airwaves, leaving consumers with more of the
same programming and fewer diverse choices.' 47 It is for this reason that
many minority business groups believe that a la carte programming would
be "devastating" for program diversity and lead to less choices for
COHSNCTS148consumers.14
Additionally, opponents of a la carte assert that it would not lead to
economic efficiencies, as the proponents suggest, but that instead a la carte
pricing actually would result in higher prices for consumers.1 49
Opponents argue that content providers will be forced to raise
subscription fees to deal with the loss of potential viewers or listeners
under a la carte programming. 50 This would, consequently, result in
higher individual channel rates for customers."5 ' Furthermore, consumers
would have to purchase the necessary equipment in order even to receive
the a la carte services, which opponents argue would result in "significant
additional equipment costs for millions of consumers."152 Lastly,
requesting households to select the specific channels they will watch or
listen to later in the month, or year, is a demanding, time-consuming
request, perhaps one which many consumers would not value.'
146 See Grebb, supra note 144.
147 Id.
148 See John Eggerton, Minority Groups Target Unbundling: Letter to Federal Comm. Comm'n Chaimnnan
Kevin Martin Compares Wholesale Program Unbundling wid Retail Cable a la Carte, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
May 29, 2008, available at httpV/www.broadcastingcable.com/article/1 13907-
Minority Groups Target Undbundling.php (noting that minority groups argue that "program bundling
increases the availability of minority-targeted programming, which boosts investment, which 'yields a higher-
quality product.'").
149 Danoff supra note 1, at 785; NCTA, supra note 145, at 3.
15 NCTA, supra note 145, at 3.
1s1 Id. For example, in a model where a subscriber chose five popular services, such as the Disney
Channel, ESPN, MTV, Fox News, and TBS, it was estimated that "the subscriber could actually pay more to
purchase only five services a la carte than the cost of a larger tier which included the same five services and
many more services as well" Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted).
152 Id. at 3.
153 Hazlett, supra note 47, at 271; see also NCTA, supra note 145, at 14.
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V. REGULATING INDECENT CONTENT THROUGH A LA CARTE
PROGRAMMING
A. What the "Voluntary" a la Carte Merger Condition Actually Means for
Consumers
Except as otherwise provided in this [Act], the Commission from
time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires,
shall . . . prescribe such . . . conditions, not inconsistent with law, as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this [Act].154
When the FCC begins its review of a proposed telecommunications
merger, often the FCC's approval is the last thing standing in the way of
the license-transfer."'s Under 47 U.S.C. S 310(d), the Commission's
licensing authority simply necessitates that the merger be in the "public
interest, convenience, and necessity."' 5  The statute supplies "little
detailed guidance on the structure or standards that should be associated
with the review process."1 s7 Because of procedural loopholes and the fact
that many of these "mega-merger license transfers" are worth billions of
dollars, the FCC and merger applicants become involved in a "high-stakes
regulatory dance" where applicants "volunteer" to abide by specific
conditions as the quid pro quo for favorable agency contemplation.' As
a result, applicants usually are left with no real choice but to submit
themselves to this "dance," or risk facing enormous delays or even a
complete rejection of the merger.' Thus, the resulting "voluntary"
conditions hardly can be termed as such, since there appears to be "very
little 'voluntariness"' in the process.16
1 47 U.S.C. S 303(r) (1997) (emphasis added).
155 Tramont, supra note 12, at 52. The FCC usually reviews a merger proposal months after the initial
plans are announced, and often after the Department ofJustice has completed its own antitrust review. Id.
156 47 U.S.C. S 310(d) (1996) (detailing that license-transfers depend upon a "finding by the
Commission that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby.").
157 Tramont, supra note 12, at 52. See also 47 U.S.C. 5 310(d); Blumensaadt, supra note 45, at 302
(noting that "[tlhe public interest standard is broad and flexible and includes consideration ofwhether the
merger is consistent with the goals of the Communications Act, Commission rules and federal
communications policy").
i58 Tramont, supra note 12, at 52.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 52-53. Moreover, "[a]bsent judicial or congressional oversight, the Commission has a free
hand to impose its view of the public interest without many of the legal or procedural restraints that typically
cabin FCC activities." Id. at 53. On the other hand, theoretically, the merger conditions can be looked at as
"voluntary" because no one is forcing the two companies to merge (although in the case of Sirius and XM, the
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Under the leadership of Chairman Martin, the FCC unleashed an
unprecedented assault on indecent content in the media.' Martin had
been both a crusader against indecent content on radio and television as
well as an advocate of a la carte options for consumers.162 The proposed
satellite radio merger consequently presented an opportunity for Martin
to further his objectives, which he believed to be in the public interest."
Martin and the FCC seized this opportunity through the Commission's
merger approval contingent on "voluntary" commitments.1
Understanding the Commission's powerful position as the last hurdle to
the proposed merger of the country's only two satellite radio stations,
former Chairman Martin and the other two commissioners who approved
the mergeries were able to achieve indirectly what they explicitly claimed
they could not do directly, that is regulate indecent content on satellite
radio.'66
This policy goal was accomplished through the a la carte and tiered
programming condition.'67 By requiring the newly merged entity to offer
smaller family-friendly tiered programming packages at discounted prices,
companies claimed that they needed to merge to survive). See gnerally Order, supra note 7, at 12389 (noting
that Sinus and XM argued that the merger was necessary for satellite radio to survive as neither company had
ever turned over a profit). Since the companies are not required to merge, they also are not required to agree
to all the conditions that the FCC is encouraging them to accept. Thus, some might argue that the conditions
actually are "voluntary." Despite this fact, typically there is a lot of money riding on merger approval and the
FCC's review usually takes place at the end of a long, arduous merger review process. See Tramont, supra note
12, at 52. By the time the Commission reviews the companies' proposed merger, it is usually the last step in a
process in which a lot of time and money has been invested by the companies, which places the FCC in a very
powerful position because it knows that, at this point, the companies "need" the merger to take place. Id. at
52-53, 55-58 (describing how the FCC uses licensees' "vulnerability" to pursue goals outside the traditional
policy-making process).
161 See Hazlett, supra note 47, at 260-61. See generally Martin, supra note 110 (detailing former
Chairman Martin's views conceming indecent content and the need for more fanily-friendly programming
options).
162 Seegenerally Martin, supra note 110 (elaborating on his views regarding indecency and viability of a
la carte options).
163 Id.
'6 Commissioner Taylor Tate also referred to herself as a "long-time supporter of family-friendly
media choices" who "shared the concern of many commenters regarding the level of coarse programming on
satellite radio." See Order, supra note 7, at 12454 (statement of Comm'r Deborah Taylor Tate).
165 Commissioners Deborah Taylor Tate and Robert M. McDowell approved the merger along with
Chairman Martin. See Order, supra note 7, at 12442 (statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin), 12451
(statement of Comm'r Deborah Taylor Tate), 12456 (statement of Comm'r Robert M. McDowell).
166 Two Commissioners dissented in separate statements. See Order, supra note 7, at 12443
(dissenting statement of Comm'r Michael J. Copps), 12445 (dissenting statement of Comm'r Jonathan S.
Adelstein).
167 See id. at 12384-89.
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as well as channels on an a la carte basis, the Commission indirectly was
able to regulate indecent content on satellite radio, which in accordance
with United States v. Playboy,168 has remained unfettered by traditional
broadcast radio regulations governing indecent content.16 9  Since the
imposition of stricter regulations and fines for indecent content on
traditional terrestrial radio, there has been a migration to satellite radio of
"shock jock" radio hosts, as well as music that was deemed "indecent"
according to the new laws.' As a result, the Commission probably was
frustrated as it saw coarse programming and "shock jocks," such as
Howard Stern, slip through its regulatory fingers as such programs
gravitated towards satellite radio."' However, by imposing the new
theme-tiered programming and a la carte requirements as a condition of
the Sirius XM Satellite Radio merger, the FCC was able to indirectly
regulate the content available to consumers on satellite radio.
In his article detailing how the FCC expands its reach through
"voluntary" agreements, Bryan Tramont explained that "when faced with
policy goals [which are] 'obstructed' by statutory or judicial impediments, the
Commission can simply achieve the same goals under the guise of
'voluntary' merger conditions."'72 The Commission, under the leadership
of former Chairman Martin, seems to have accomplished just this task in
the satellite radio merger. By conditioning the FCC's license-transfer
approval upon numerous commitments, the Commission was able to
achieve its own policy goals, specifically Chairman Martin's indecency
168 529 U.S. 803 (2000). The Court's holding in Playboy "signals the Court's unease in applying the
Pacfia indecency analysis outside the broadcast paradigm." See Elliott, supra note 29, at 275.
169 See generally Order, supra note 7 (requiring the newly merged satellite radio station to offer family-
friendly tiered programming packages and channels on an a la carte basis); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978) (detailing FCC authority to regulate indecent content on traditional broadcast radio).
170 See Elliott, supra note 29, at 275-76 (noting that "the flight of programs like Howard Stem's to
satellite radio has prompted calls from Congress, the public, and broadcasters to extend the indecency controls
to all media, including satellite.").
171 See, e.g., Corn-Revere, supra note 81, at 244 ("Before ascending to the chairmanship of the FCC,
Commissioner Kevin Martin testified to Congress ... that '[i]n a world in which more than 85% of homes
receive their television programming from cable and satellite providers, we need a comprehensive solution.'
He noted that 'programming that broadcast networks reject because of concerns about content may end up on
competing basic cable networks, and radio personalities that we have fined for indecency violations just move
to satellite radio.'").
172 Tramont, supra note 12, at 57-58 (emphasis added) (Tramont's insight is the product of his role as
the former Legal Advisor in the office of former Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth). See also
Blunensandt, supra note 45, at 301 (noting that "by the nature of its authority, FCC merger conditions can be
used as effective and powerful regulatory tools.").
2010] SIRIUS XM SATELLITE RADIO MERGER 249
regulation and a la carte goals," 3 "under the guise of 'voluntary' merger
conditions. "l74 As a consequence, business decisions such as whether to
implement an a la carte programming scheme and whether it would be
beneficial to offer smaller theme-based programming packages were
removed from the companies' editorial judgment.
However, the FCC is not permitted to use merger-specific conditions
as a device to accomplish indirectly what the Commission cannot
accomplish directly."' Because the FCC had openly stated on numerous
occasions that it did not have the authority to regulate indecent content on
subscription-based services,"' including satellite radio, it follows that the
Commission should not be able to regulate indecency on satellite radio
indirectly through a merger condition mandating tiered-programming
and a la carte options. Despite the fact that some would assert that the
condition was based more on economic considerations,"' this mandate
was inherently content-based and, if challenged in court, it would receive
First Amendment strict scrutiny review and likely be struck down."'
However, because the tiered-programming and a la carte options were
1' Martin's predecessor, former FCC Chairman Michael Powell, also argued for a single indecency
standard for First Amendment analysis that "recognize[d] the reality of the media marketplace and respect[ed]
the intelligence of American consumers." Reed Hundt, Regulating Indecency: The Federal Communications
Commission's Threat to the FirstAmendment, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 13, at *6, *6 n.3 (2005).
1 See Tramont, supm note 12, at 57-58; Hazlett, supra note 47, at 260-61 (noting that "[c]urrent
reports suggest that FCC Chairman Kevin Martin is pursuing an 'indecency agenda'"). See generally Order,
supra note 7 (listing the "voluntary conditions").
175 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. S 303(r) (1997) (giving the Commission authority to prescribe conditions "not
inconsistent with law") (emphasis added). But see Tramont, supra note 12, at 51-55 (describing ways in which the
FCC attempts to evade legal oversight).
176 See, e.g., In re Litig. Recovery Trust, 17 F.C.C.R 21852, 21856 (2002); In re Applications of
Harriscope of Chi., Inc., 3 F.C.C.R 757, 760 n.2 (1988) (citing Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420 (11th Cir.
1985)).
17 See Order, supra note 7, at 12442 (statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin) ("I have long believed
that consumers should be able to buy and pay for only those channels that they want. Such a free market
approach to programming . .. would benefit consumers through lower prices . . . ."). But see generally Hazlett,
supra note 47 (questioning whether a la carte programming is actually in the public interest economically);
FCC REPORT ON A LA CARTE I, supra note 123 (finding that although an a la carte option would allow
consumers to pay for only the programming they choose, few consumers would experience lower bills for
multi-channel programming).
178 See Corn-Revere, supra note 81, at 264 (noting that "even if a la carte or tiering rules were proposed
ostensibly to further some economic or other rationale, various cases apply strict scrutiny to such regulations if
they impose a discriminatory economic burden on speakers.") (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991)); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656,660 (2004) (noting that
"the Constitution demands that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid"); United States v.
Playboy, 529 U.S. 803,813 (2000).
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imposed via a "voluntary" merger condition accepted by the two parties,
challenging the legality of the condition likely would be significantly more
difficult, if not impossible.17 9 Thus, even though the FCC had
continually stated that it did not have the authority to regulate indecent
content on subscription-based services, it found a way to effectively evade
legal oversight by regulating content on satellite radio through a
"voluntary," as well as controversial," merger condition."'
B. The Problems with the Theme-Tiered Programming and a la Carte
"Voluntary" Merger Condition and Regulation "Through the Back Door"
There are many problems associated with the theme-tiered
programming and a la carte "voluntary" merger condition, as well as the
FCC's indirect regulation of satellite radio, that cause the Commission's
actions not to be in the public interest.
To begin with, considering the recent controversy within the FCC
itself concerning whether a la carte programming would be economically
beneficial to consumers,182  mandating both the theme-tiered
programming and a la carte pricing options was far from a guaranteed
179 See Tramont, supra note 12, at 52-53 ("When the licensee proposes the 'voluntary conditions' and
the Commission adopts them, there is little or no basis for judicial review because the conditions are all
characterized as 'voluntary.' Although Congress has questioned the FCC's process at times, it has thus far
chosen not to offer a legislative solution to the unpredictable, lengthy, and demanding FCC license-transfer
process. Absentjudicial or congressional oversight, the Commission has a free hand to impose its view of the
public interest without many of the legal or procedural restraints that typically cabin FCC activities.")
(footnotes omitted). See also Blumensaadt, supra note 45, at 301 ("It is significant to note that the conditions are
'voluntary' conditions agreed to by the applicants, so once accepted, it is unlikely that a court will entertain a
challenge by the applicants.... Thus, by the nature of its authority, FCC merger conditions can be used as
effective and powerful regulatory tools.") (footnotes omitted); Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reforn,
and the Hidden Side of theAdministratire State, 61 ADMIN. L REv. 675,708 (2009) (asserting that "because the very
nature of the [merger-review] proceeding involves 'voluntary' concessions, this type of action is outside the
scope ofjudicial review.").
1 See Order, supra note 7, at 12448-49 (dissenting statement of Comm'rJonathan S. Adelstein) ("A la
carte makes its appearance here without any empirical analysis or any discussion reflective of the controversy
surrounding the Commission's oum a la carte inquiries.") (emphasis added). Compare FCC REPORT ONA LA CARTE
I, supra note 123 (finding that although an a la carte option would allow consumers to pay for only the
programming they choose, few consumers would experience lower bills for multi-channel programming),
with FCC REPORT ON A LA CARTE II, supra note 127 (finding a la carte pricing to be in the public interest).
181 See Tramont, supra note 12, at 52-53.
18 Compare FCC REPORT ONA LA CARTE I, supra note 123 (finding that although an a la carte option
would allow consumers to pay for only the programming they choose, few consumers would experience
lower bills for multi-channel programming), with FCC REPORT ON A LA CARTE II, supra note 127 (finding a
la carte pricing to be in the public interest).
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public interest benefit of the merger.183  Moreover, the FCC failed to
consider the negative repercussions that could flow from unbundling,
such as the possible negative effects of a la carte on the diversity of
programming.' Maintaining a diverse range of programming options for
consumers to choose from is an important public interest concern, and
one that has been threatened recently by the latest ownership
deregulations which have lead to many media mergers. In fact, one of the
significant benefits that satellite radio offered consumers was the diverse,
niche channels.' A la carte programming, however, will threaten
diversity even further because it causes the disappearance of smaller,
unique channels that can no longer afford to compete with the more
popular, mainstream channels."a'
By requiring the new family-friendly tiered packages and a la carte
options, the Commission could have been hoping that it would be able to
force off of satellite radio, or at least make less profitable, the same
indecent content that it forced off of terrestrial radio through the
imposition of heavy fines." However, channels such as Howard Stern
aM See Order, supra note 7, at 12448 (dissenting statement ofComm'rJonathan S. Adelstein) ("While
the majority accepts the Applicants' 'voluntary commitment' to offer newly defined and a la carte
programming packages, the benefits, never mind the merger-specific benefits, of such offerings are far from
clear.").
184 See, e.g., id. at 12448-49; NCTA, supra note 145 (arguing that a la carte programming does not offer
any benefit to most consumers and, instead, will result in less choice and less programming diversity);
Christopher T. Buckley, A La Carte v. Channel Bundling: The Debate Over Video Programming Dsfribution, 20
LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 413, 419 (2008) ("In addition, consumer choice would decline as diversity of
programming would decrease due to the disappearance of smaller cable channels because of a lack of
subscribers. As many smaller cable networks only exist because of the support that more popular networks
provide through bundling, la carte opponents contend bundles 'are not anticonsumer but proconsumer.'")
(footnotes omitted).
185 See, e.g., Order, supra note 7, at 12349, 12354-56.
186 See Buckley, supra note 184, at 419. Seealsosupra Part IV.D.2.
187 See Hazlett, supra note 47, at 281 (explaining how offering channels on an a la carte basis rather
than bundling channels "'would be the death of independent programmers and [would result in] fewer
programming choices for consumers'" because these channels would not be able to survive independently in
an a la carte regime). For examples of how the FCC's recent imposition of"draconian fines" has impacted the
content of terrestrial radio, see Patricia Cohen, 'Howl' in an Era That Fears Indecency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,2007,
at E3 (detailing how poet Allen Ginsburg's famous poem "Howl" only "was heard online and not on the New
York radio station WBAI-FM . .. because the station ... feared that by broadcasting 'Howl' it could run afoul
of the [FCC's] interpretation of indecency and incur bankrupting fines."); Jeff Leeds, Scrambling to Fill a
Vacancy After Stem, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct 6, 2005, at El ("[M]any programmers say that since ... Janet Jackson's
notorious Super Bowl 'wardrobe malfunction' touched off a political firestorm over indecency on television,
their radio stations have become less willing to broadcast the raunchy content that became the stock-in-trade
for many of Mr. Stem's imitators. Sexual jokes and bathroom humor may remain common on morning
radio, but many of the personalities considered the most extreme have already been silenced. One of them is
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and Playboy engendered huge increases in subscriptions to Sirius,'"'
bringing into question whether subscribers to satellite radio would
actually value the a la carte options and family-friendly packages.' 89
Additionally, when the FCC chose to regulate indirectly "through the
back door" there was a lack of transparency in the process, which in turn
undermined the public's confidence in the Commission. 90 If the FCC
actually does have the authority to regulate indecent content on satellite
radio based on spectrum scarcity considerations or on a new indecency
framework,"' then the Commission should use the traditional
administrative law policy-making process to do so. When the FCC
originally asserted that it could not regulate indecency on satellite radio,
but then decided to regulate that same content on satellite radio indirectly
through the imposition of "voluntary" conditions attached to its structural
review, the Commission both undermined its authority and also avoided
procedural and constitutional oversight.192
Bubba the Love Sponge, a radio host based in Tampa, Fla., who was fired by Clear Channel Communications
last year after the [FCC] imposed a record $755,000 fine against the company for his show's graphic
discussion of sex. (Bubba recently signed on to appear on one of Mr. Stem's two channels on Sirius.)").
1ss See Eric A. Taub, Merger on Horizon for Satellite Radio Listener Numbers Have Rocketed, But Stock Prices
Have Tumbled, IMT'L HERALD TRIB.,Jan. 3, 2007, at 13 ("The debut last year of Howard Stem's radio show on
Sirius Satellite Radio put the technology on the map, raising the public's awareness of satellite radio and
helping to significantly increase subscriber totals for Sirius and its larger rival, XM Satellite Radio. Today,
thanks in part to the outsize radio personality, the Stem Effect has increased Sirius's base to about 6 million
subscribers, up 80 percent from one year ago."); see also Danoff supra note 1, at 789 ("The plain truth is that the
FCC imposed a tremendous amount of fines on Howard Stern. Howard then left broadcast media and his
audience-half of six million-followed!").
189 See Hazlett, supra note 47, at 292 (noting that "[the reality is that [family-friendly] packages, while
offering a potential political solution, would be rarely used by actual consumers.").
i90 See generally Tramont, supra note 12 (detailing how the FCC expands its power through
"voluntary" agreements that "emerge from an elaborate and often secret process of demands and
'negotiations'"); Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Separating Politics From Policy in FCC Merger
Reviews: A Basic Legal Primer of the "Public Interest" Standard, 18 PHOENIX CENTER POL'Y BULL. 1 (2007),
available at httpVwww.phoenix-center.orgfpcpb.html. See also Weiser, supra note 179, at 678 ("In the case of the
FCC, its current lack of data-driven decisionmaking and emphasis on political dealing hinders the
thoughtfulness of its analysis, limits its ability to address issues effectively, and invites a cynical attitude toward
government.").
191 See Phillips, supra note 30, at 277-85 (noting that "[a]s a communication medium, satellite radio is
not equivalent to broadcast media."). But see id. at 286 (noting that "[d]espite this constitutional analysis,
Congress may move forward with a content-based regulation that restricts indecent content on satellite
radio.").
192 See Corn-Revere, supra note 81, at 263 ("Although a la carte requirements have been put forward
in the past as a form a rate regulation, more recent proposals are overtlyframed as measures to control programming
content as well") (emphasis added); see also Weiser, supra note 179, at 708 ("Technically speaking, [the merger-
review] proceedings are adjudications, but practically speaking, they are often negotiations where the FCC
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First Amendment problems also exist with the FCC's decision to
indirectly regulate content on satellite radio. By requiring the newly
merged satellite radio company to offer a la carte and family friendly
programming as a condition of the merger, the FCC intruded upon the
newly merged company's editorial judgment concerning the mix of
programming services and how the channels should be bundled." In
accordance with Playboy, content on satellite radio should receive greater
First Amendment protection. 94 However, the Commission diluted this
First Amendment protection with the a la carte and family-friendly
programming condition. Because the content on satellite radio is given
greater First Amendment protection, the decision whether to air programs
that might be regarded as indecent by some members of the public should
be within the business judgment of the company. As noted earlier, the
conditions are theoretically "voluntary" and the companies did not have to
merge, meaning that they did not have to agree to these conditions;'95 on
the other hand, at the time the conditions were proposed, in theory the
companies "had" to merge-Sirius and XM had invested an enormous
amount of time and money into the proposed merger and likely were
willing to agree to almost anything to close the deal.'96
Moreover, the Commission took advantage of the vulnerable position
in which both Sirius and XM found themselves.'97 The DOJ had already
approved the merger so the FCC's approval of the license-transfer was the
only obstacle standing in the proposed entity's way. In this case, the FCC
took an especially long time to review the proposed merger, thus leaving
seeks to leverage its authority to approve the merger to obtain concessions that often have little or nothing to
do with the competitive issues raised by the transaction.").
193 See Corn-Revere, supra note 81, at 263-64 ("Although a la carte requirements have been put
forward in the past as a form of rate regulation, more recent proposals are ovetly frtamed as measures to control
programming content as well. In any event, proposals to require operators to construct 'family-friendly' tiers
cannot be disguised as rate regulation. Such proposals are, by definition, motivated by conent-based considerations....
Such measures necessarily would intrude on cable operators' editorial choices regarding the mix of programming
services to offer and how they should be bundled.") (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
194 See United States v. Playboy Entm't. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 805 (2000) (explaining that
subscription services are not as uniquely pervasive as traditional broadcast media because subscription services
require consumers to take affirmative steps to bring content into their homes or cars).
195 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
1% See Tramont, supra note 12, at 52, 57 (explaining how the FCC's approval was the last thing
standing in the way of the proposed merger); see generally Order, supra note 7, at 12348, 12358 (noting that
Sirius and XM came to the FCC seeking approval in February 2007, but the merger was not approved until
July 2008).
197 See Tramont, supra note 12, at 51; see also Order, supra note 7, at 12389 (noting that "both Sirius and
XM have experienced billions of dollars in losses and that neither company has ever turned a profit").
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the transaction hanging in the balance.'" It is no coincidence that this
merger ended up being "one of the most heavily-conditioned in FCC
history.""' The Commission took so long to approve the merger
contingent upon all of the "voluntary" conditions that it desired, that
when the license-transfer approval was ultimately granted, it might have
been too late.2" Sirius XM most likely did not anticipate the FCC taking
an entire year and a half to approve the license-transfer, thus leaving the
newly merged entity in the midst of an economic downfall which in turn
caused some of satellite radio's biggest partners, the automakers in
Detroit, to become among the hardest hit.20 1 With Sirius XM coming
close to filing for bankruptcy and perhaps ceasing to exist, it is not clear
that the public interest really is benefiting from the merger. By delaying
the merger approval so long in order to attempt to advance the
Commission's own ideological policy agenda, the FCC almost rid the
airwaves of satellite radio itself. Today, as a consequence, a new
technology that had enormous potential to redefine the competitive
landscape, instead, continues to struggle to exist.
VI. CONCLUSION
By mandating the a la carte and family-friendly programming
packages condition, the FCC may have ended the debate about whether
the Commission has the power to regulate indecency directly on satellite
radio. Because the newly merged entity now is required to provide
family-friendly packages and the option to purchase channels on an a la
carte basis, those alleging that the FCC has the authority to regulate
content on SDARS face an uphill battle because the a la carte and family-
friendly packages provide a "less restrictive alternative" than applying the
198 See generally Order, supra note 7 (explaining how Sirius and XM came to the FCC seeking approval
in February 2007, but the merger was not approved by the FCC until July 2008). See also Tramont, supra note
12, at 57.
*9 See Order, supra note 7, at 12456 (statement of Comm'r Robert M. McDowell).
2 See, e.g., Tim Arango, Satelite Radio Still Reaches for de Payday, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at BU1
("Today, five months after regulators approved a merger of Sirius and XM, satellite radio's pioneers and
former rivals, in a deal that was supposed to deliver their industry to the promised land of profits and
permanence, the company faces an uncertain future."). In fact, Sirius XM recently was forced to enter an
investment deal with Liberty Media, the owner of DirecTV to help "the beleaguered satellite radio company
stave off a default on some of its bonds and a potential bankruptcy filing." See de la Merced, supra note 15, at
B5.
201 See Arango, supra note 200, at BU1 (noting that "the bulk of new satellite radio subscribers come
from partnerships with automakers").
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traditional broadcast indecency regulations to satellite radio. Moreover,
because the conditions were "voluntary" and agreed to by the parties,
challenging the legality of the condition will likely be significantly more
difficult.202 If the Commission continues to maintain the distinction
between broadcast media and subscription-based services, such as satellite
radio, due to the fact that SDARS providers offer methods for consumers
to limit their exposure to indecent content, as well as perhaps benefitting
economically by not paying for channels that they elect to block, an
extension of Pacifica to satellite radio now seems highly unlikely.
By taking advantage of the vulnerability of the satellite radio
companies when they arrived at the FCC seeking merger approval in
order to advance the Commission's larger anti-indecency agenda, the
Commission delayed a merger to the disadvantage of the public interest,
undermined public confidence in the FCC, and avoided the procedural
and perhaps constitutional problems it might have encountered had the
FCC followed the proper administrative law process. Only time will tell
what will be the fate of both indecent content on satellite radio and of
Sirius XM itself.
2 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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